Following felony convictions for assault with force likely to produce great bodily injury and discharging a firearm with gross negligence, the Review Department affirmed a recommendation of disbarment. The facts showed that while severely intoxicated, Smart pinned a visiting service provider to a bed, triggering a violent fight with her bodyguard; he then fired his brother’s gun in a residential neighborhood, with the bullet entering a neighbor’s garage door. Smart pled guilty to the felonies; after the criminal record was transmitted, he was placed on interim suspension and referred for moral-turpitude review. :contentReference[oaicite:4]{index=4}

At trial, Smart sought to recast the incident (including a late-raised claim of self-defense) and to diminish the credibility of hearsay in police reports. The hearing judge found his testimony not credible and relied on victim statements that had been admitted without objection—findings the Review Department largely credited, noting the hearing judge’s vantage to assess demeanor and that the reports were properly considered given how they entered the record. The court declined to let Smart’s self-defense theory negate his guilty pleas. :contentReference[oaicite:5]{index=5}

Turning to discipline, the Review Department held that the facts and circumstances of the felony convictions involved moral turpitude because they reflected contempt for law and disregard for the safety of others, which undermines public confidence in the profession. While Smart offered mitigation (long practice without discipline; character evidence; cooperation; treatment for alcoholism and mental health conditions), the court found it not “most compelling” and concluded his rehabilitation efforts were in an early phase; sobriety had not yet been shown to be stable. Under the then-applicable former Standard 2.15(b), disbarment was presumed for felony convictions involving moral turpitude, and no reason appeared to deviate. :contentReference[oaicite:6]{index=6}