In the Matter of Hunsdon Cary Stewart (1994)

Overview

This conviction referral case addresses the disciplinary consequences of an attorney’s misdemeanor battery conviction arising from a domestic dispute involving police intervention. While the Review Department concluded that the conduct did not rise to the level of moral turpitude, it held that the surrounding facts constituted serious misconduct warranting actual suspension, particularly in light of alcohol involvement, escalation of a family-law dispute, and the attorney’s recent prior discipline.

Facts

Hunsdon Cary Stewart was a seasoned attorney with more than two decades of practice, including extensive experience in family law and child custody matters. The conviction arose from a May 27, 1990 incident involving Stewart’s estranged wife and their 18-month-old child.

Before a scheduled visit with his child, Stewart consumed one or two drinks of a 100-proof alcoholic beverage. When electrical power was out in his apartment and the child became distressed, Stewart took the child to his estranged wife’s apartment in the same building. When she refused to allow the visit to continue there and attempted to close the door, Stewart asserted his perceived legal rights, citing Penal Code provisions and intimidating his way into the apartment.

Police officers were summoned. When officers instructed Stewart to leave, he refused to do so without the child. As an officer attempted to escort him out, Stewart resisted, grabbed the officer in a “bear hug,” and engaged in a physical struggle. Both Stewart and the officer sustained minor injuries. Stewart was arrested, continued to act abusively toward the officers—including using racial epithets—and was later convicted by jury of misdemeanor battery on a police officer under Penal Code section 243(c).

Procedural Posture

After Stewart’s conviction became final, the Supreme Court referred the matter to the State Bar Court for a conviction referral hearing to determine whether the surrounding facts involved moral turpitude or other misconduct warranting discipline. The hearing judge found no moral turpitude but did find misconduct warranting discipline and recommended a stayed suspension with actual suspension. Stewart sought review, asserting procedural errors, judicial bias, and disputing the underlying facts of the conviction.

Key Legal Holdings

Moral Turpitude Analysis

The Review Department agreed that Stewart’s conduct did not constitute moral turpitude. However, his actions—including alcohol use before visiting his child, trespass into his estranged wife’s apartment, resistance to police authority, physical struggle with an officer, and racially abusive language—demonstrated poor judgment and created a serious risk of harm, warranting professional discipline.

Aggravating and Mitigating Factors

• Aggravation: Prior discipline imposed shortly after the incident; multiple acts of misconduct; alcohol involvement; lack of insight and fixation on his own version of events; escalation of a domestic dispute despite extensive family law experience.
• Mitigation: Participation in disciplinary proceedings; no mitigation for prior years of discipline-free practice due to earlier reliance on that factor.

Outcome

The Review Department adopted the hearing judge’s recommendation. Stewart was suspended for two years, with execution stayed, placed on probation for two years, and ordered to serve 60 days of actual suspension. He was also required to participate in substance abuse programs and comply with standard probationary conditions. Costs were awarded to the State Bar.

Sanctions Table