In the Matter of Anderson
Facts
Ernest Linford Anderson, a California attorney, accumulated a long history of alcohol-related driving offenses spanning nearly a decade, culminating in two conviction referrals arising from incidents in 1985 and 1988. The record also reflected earlier alcohol-related driving incidents in 1979 and 1983.
In 1983, Anderson was observed intoxicated at a business, warned by a deputy sheriff not to drive, and nevertheless drove away. He was later stopped by the California Highway Patrol and behaved abusively and uncooperatively toward officers. He was ultimately convicted on two drunk-driving counts arising from separate 1983 incidents and placed on probation.
In January 1985, while still on probation, Anderson consumed approximately 10–12 alcoholic drinks and drove. He nearly caused a traffic collision, stumbled upon exiting his vehicle, and smelled strongly of alcohol. When an officer attempted to administer sobriety testing, Anderson physically shoved the officer, fled the scene at high speed without headlights, and was later arrested at home. His blood alcohol level measured 0.20. He pled guilty to drunk driving and was again placed on probation with strict alcohol-related conditions.
The most recent incident occurred in April 1988. After drinking wine at multiple restaurants during lunch, Anderson was reported by citizens who feared for public safety. Although his vehicle did not leave the parking area, he exhibited clear signs of intoxication. During police contact, Anderson touched an officer’s holstered firearm, resisted arrest, kicked an officer, made threats during transport, vacillated repeatedly about chemical testing, and behaved erratically enough to require psychiatric observation. He later pled nolo contendere to drunk driving and received a jail sentence with probation.
The record further showed Anderson had prosecuted dozens of DUI cases early in his career as a deputy district attorney, demonstrating his awareness of the dangers of drunk driving. He also had two prior disciplinary reprovals for client neglect and failure to communicate, unrelated in subject matter but considered aggravating.
Charges
- Discipline based on multiple criminal convictions for driving under the influence.
- Whether the facts and circumstances of those convictions involved moral turpitude.
- Alternatively, whether the conduct constituted other misconduct warranting discipline under California attorney discipline standards.
Defenses
- No moral turpitude: Anderson argued that DUI offenses, even with priors, do not per se establish moral turpitude under California Supreme Court precedent.
- Mitigation and rehabilitation: He presented evidence of sobriety, psychiatric treatment for alcoholism and depression, and strong character evidence from judges and colleagues.
- No client harm: Anderson emphasized that none of the incidents involved harm to clients or interference with legal representation.
Court’s Ruling
The Review Department affirmed the hearing judge’s conclusion that Anderson’s drunk-driving convictions, while extremely serious and dangerous, did not rise to the level of moral turpitude under controlling Supreme Court authority, including In re Kelley.
However, the court held that Anderson’s repeated offenses, confrontations with law enforcement, violation of probation conditions, and prior prosecutorial experience demonstrated a grave disregard for public safety and professional responsibilities. The conduct therefore constituted other misconduct warranting discipline.
In aggravation, the court relied on Anderson’s prior disciplinary record and the escalating seriousness of his criminal conduct. In mitigation, it credited his character evidence and partial rehabilitation efforts, but noted the absence of sustained participation in alcohol recovery programs.
Sanctions
| Discipline | Details |
|---|---|
| Suspension | One year stayed |
| Actual Suspension | 60 days |
| Probation | Three years with conditions |
| Additional Conditions | Pass the California Professional Responsibility Examination; comply with probationary terms; pay costs |
