In the Matter of Lawrence Buckley (1990)
Citation: 1 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 201
Decided: October 11, 1990
Judges: Pearlman, P.J.; Norian, J.; Stovitz, J.
Background
Attorney Lawrence Buckley, admitted to practice in 1966, was convicted in 1987 on a plea of nolo contendere to violating Penal Code section 647(a) — solicitation of a lewd act in a public place, a misdemeanor. The California Supreme Court referred the matter to the State Bar Court to determine whether the conviction involved moral turpitude or other misconduct warranting discipline. The original hearing referee recommended dismissal, finding no moral turpitude. However, the former Review Department reversed that recommendation, concluding that discipline was warranted and remanded for further hearing.
On remand, the hearing referee adopted the examiner’s recommendation of a one-year suspension (stayed), no actual suspension, one year of probation, and passage of the Professional Responsibility Examination (PRE). Buckley sought review, contending that such discipline was excessive.
Key Issues
- Whether the misdemeanor conviction involved moral turpitude or warranted discipline under the Standards for Attorney Sanctions.
- Whether Buckley’s prior disciplinary record justified suspension instead of reproval.
- Whether the recommended suspension was disproportionate to the nature of the offense.
Findings
The Review Department affirmed that Buckley’s conviction did not involve moral turpitude but nonetheless constituted misconduct warranting discipline. The offense was unrelated to the practice of law and considered a minor, non-serious sex offense. The Department noted that similar convictions typically resulted in private reprovals absent aggravating circumstances.
Buckley’s prior record consisted of two private reprovals — one in 1976 for abandonment and failure to return unearned fees, and another in 1980 for contempt arising from courtroom conduct. The Department held that these dissimilar and dated priors did not justify a suspension, but did warrant elevating discipline from private to public reproval. Buckley had since demonstrated rehabilitation by repaying the unearned fee despite bankruptcy, showing candor, and maintaining a long, unblemished public defender career.
Legal Analysis
Under Standard 3.4 (Criminal Convictions Not Involving Moral Turpitude), discipline should correspond to the seriousness of the misconduct. Because Buckley’s conduct was unrelated to his practice and less severe than offenses such as willful failure to file taxes or driving under the influence (In re Rohan, 21 Cal.3d 195; In re Carr, 46 Cal.3d 1089), the Department held that suspension would be disproportionate.
The Department also considered Standard 1.7(a), which calls for increased discipline when an attorney has prior sanctions. It declined to apply Standard 1.7(b) (presumptive disbarment after two priors) because the prior misconduct was minimal, unrelated, and remote in time. Applying that standard, the Department found that imposing suspension would be “manifestly unjust.”
Mitigating and Aggravating Factors
| Factor | Finding |
|---|---|
| Mitigation | No moral turpitude; unrelated to practice; prior good character and candor; restitution made despite bankruptcy; long service in public defense; no harm to clients. |
| Aggravation | Two prior private reprovals; initial misrepresentation of occupation at arrest; failure to carry ID; minor uncooperativeness with police. |
Holding and Discipline
- The Review Department reduced discipline to a public reproval.
- Buckley was ordered to take and pass the Professional Responsibility Examination (PRE) within one year.
- Failure to comply with the PRE requirement may itself constitute cause for separate discipline under Rule 1-110 of the Rules of Professional Conduct.
Significance
The case establishes that minor, non-practice-related misdemeanors — even with prior discipline — should not automatically lead to suspension or disbarment. It clarifies proportionality under the State Bar’s Standards for Attorney Sanctions: two remote, unrelated priors do not trigger the presumption of disbarment when misconduct is trivial or rehabilitative conduct predominates. The decision also confirms that requiring passage of the PRE can serve as a rehabilitative, non-punitive condition for public reproval.