Facts

Daniel G. Meza was admitted to the California Bar in 1983 and practiced criminal defense. In November 1990, Meza was convicted of violating Penal Code §288.5 — engaging in three or more acts of substantial sexual conduct with a child under age 14. This felony constituted a crime of moral turpitude per se. He was sentenced to probation with no jail time and placed under psychiatric supervision. Pursuant to Business and Professions Code §6102(a), the Acting Presiding Judge of the State Bar Court ordered Meza interimly suspended pending final disciplinary proceedings.

Before the suspension took effect, Meza petitioned to set it aside, citing good cause under §6102(a). He argued that leniency in sentencing, successful rehabilitation, the absence of harm to clients, and the financial hardship to his family justified lifting the suspension. The Office of Trials opposed the motion, arguing that public protection outweighed personal hardship and that the record was insufficient to prove rehabilitation before an evidentiary hearing.

Charges and Legal Basis

The underlying conviction arose from criminal sexual misconduct, a felony of moral turpitude. Interim suspension is automatic under §6102(a) when an attorney is convicted of such a crime unless “good cause” is shown to vacate. The Review Department considered whether Meza demonstrated good cause to overturn his interim suspension before final discipline was determined.

Sanctions Table

Result and Significance

The Review Department held that Meza failed to demonstrate “good cause” to vacate his interim suspension. The court emphasized that interim suspension serves to protect the public, courts, and profession until a full disciplinary record is developed. Contested claims of rehabilitation or hardship cannot substitute for verified evidence at this stage. The panel ordered Meza interimly suspended effective thirty days after service of its opinion and directed compliance with Rule 955 (now Rule 9.20) regarding notice and client withdrawal.

The decision reaffirms that attorneys convicted of felonies involving moral turpitude are presumptively unsuitable to practice pending final resolution and that financial hardship to the lawyer’s family does not outweigh public protection or the integrity of the profession.

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