Facts

Respondent Jack Robert Rech was admitted to the California State Bar in 1974. In the early 1980s, he represented Arturo Arocha on serious drug charges, ultimately negotiating a reduction that allowed Arocha to avoid prison. After the criminal case, respondent developed a personal and business relationship with Arocha that extended well beyond the attorney-client relationship.

In late 1982 or early 1983, respondent financed Arocha’s acquisition of a residence in Alamo Heights. Although Arocha was the true owner, respondent took title in his own name to conceal ownership and prevent forfeiture if authorities discovered Arocha’s ongoing drug activity. Respondent kept an unrecorded deed for Arocha and deliberately avoided documenting the arrangement out of fear federal agents might seize his files.

Respondent later entered a real estate development venture in Rancho California with a former police officer, Ronald Clem. Respondent brought Arocha into the project as a partner without disclosing his prior defense of Arocha on drug charges. When Arocha made large cash payments—often $8,000 to $10,000 at a time—Clem suspected the money came from illegal drug sales. Despite these warnings and his own knowledge of the illicit source of funds, respondent continued the venture and took responsibility for handling Arocha’s cash.

Over several years, respondent repeatedly hid large sums of cash for Arocha, including one instance involving a bag containing between $75,000 and $200,000. He also made intentional misrepresentations to Arocha about Clem, falsely blaming Clem for delays in selling the property, even though respondent knew such statements could endanger Clem and his family. Ultimately, respondent loaned Arocha $30,000 to facilitate a drug transaction, knowing repayment and interest would come from illegal drug sales.

Criminal Conviction

In April 1988, respondent pled guilty to felony conspiracy to impair the collection of federal income taxes in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371. He was sentenced to five years in prison (with most of the term suspended), placed on probation, fined $100,000, and ordered to perform extensive community service. He later completed probation and was discharged in 1991.

Disciplinary Charges

• Business & Professions Code §6106: Moral turpitude arising from the facts and circumstances surrounding the felony conviction.
• Conviction-based discipline: Felony conduct potentially involving moral turpitude requiring independent evaluation of underlying acts.
• Interim suspension: Ordered following conviction, with later disputes regarding credit for time served.

Moral Turpitude Analysis

The Review Department emphasized that conspiracy to impair the collection of federal income taxes may or may not involve moral turpitude depending on the facts. Here, respondent stipulated—and the evidence clearly showed—that his conduct involved repeated acts of moral turpitude. These included concealing true ownership of property to prevent forfeiture, laundering approximately $100,000 in drug proceeds through real estate ventures, repeatedly hiding illegal cash, making intentional misrepresentations that endangered others, and directly financing illegal drug trafficking.

Mitigation and Aggravation

The hearing judge credited respondent with mitigation, including candor and cooperation with the State Bar, favorable character testimony, pro bono work, partial rehabilitation, and the absence of prior discipline for approximately eight years before the misconduct began. However, the Review Department gave this mitigation limited weight, noting that respondent’s misconduct spanned roughly four years and was neither isolated nor aberrational.

Aggravation was established by multiple acts of wrongdoing. Although concealment was inherent in the moral turpitude analysis, it was not double-counted as a separate aggravating factor.

Outcome

The hearing judge recommended a lengthy stayed suspension with actual suspension and proof of rehabilitation. On review, the Review Department rejected that recommendation, concluding that disbarment is the presumptive discipline for serious crimes involving moral turpitude and that respondent’s mitigation was not compelling in light of the gravity, duration, and nature of his misconduct.

Sanctions