In the Matter of Respondent I

Facts

Respondent I was admitted to the California State Bar in 1978 and voluntarily placed himself on inactive status in 1981. He subsequently moved to Arizona, where he worked as a stockbroker and did not practice law. While residing outside California, respondent sustained two misdemeanor convictions for driving under the influence of alcohol in 1986 and 1987.

The first incident occurred in 1986 when an officer observed respondent driving erratically late at night, including weaving and crossing into adjacent lanes. Respondent failed field sobriety tests and registered a blood alcohol level of .146. He pleaded no contest and completed a sentence consisting of license restrictions, a fine, and alcohol education.

The second incident occurred in 1987 and involved a rear-end collision causing no serious injuries. Respondent again exhibited signs of intoxication, registered blood alcohol levels as high as .26, and was convicted following a jury trial. He was sentenced to 60 days in jail with a work-release provision.

Immediately after the second arrest, respondent ceased drinking alcohol entirely and began intensive psychotherapy addressing both alcohol use and underlying personal issues. Several years later, after accepting employment with a federal agency in California, respondent reactivated his California bar membership.

Completion of the Arizona jail sentence was delayed while respondent attempted to serve the sentence in California to avoid losing his federal employment. Arizona judicial authorities ultimately found that respondent’s failure to appear for sentence execution was not willful or contemptuous. Respondent completed the sentence, passed alcohol screening, and maintained sobriety for more than five years before the disciplinary proceedings concluded.

Charges

• Professional discipline based on two misdemeanor DUI convictions
• “Other misconduct warranting discipline” under the State Bar’s inherent authority

The parties stipulated that the convictions did not involve moral turpitude. The sole issue was whether the facts and circumstances nevertheless warranted professional discipline.

Defenses

Respondent argued that no discipline was warranted because the misconduct occurred while he was inactive, out of state, and not practicing law, and bore no nexus to his fitness to practice law.

He emphasized that he did not act violently, did not show disrespect for the legal system, complied with criminal sanctions, and demonstrated substantial rehabilitation, including long-term sobriety and successful federal legal employment.

Respondent further argued that imposing discipline would violate due process because the standard for “other misconduct warranting discipline” was unconstitutionally vague as applied to non-turpitudinous, off-duty conduct.

Court’s Ruling

The Review Department affirmed dismissal of the disciplinary proceeding. It held that not every criminal violation by an attorney warrants professional discipline and that discipline requires more than mere criminality where moral turpitude is absent.

The court found no nexus between respondent’s DUI convictions and the practice of law. The misconduct occurred while respondent was inactive, out of state, and engaged in a different profession. Unlike cases such as In re Kelley and In re Hickey, respondent was not on probation, did not violate court orders, and did not demonstrate ongoing risk to clients, courts, or the public.

Critically, the court credited evidence of rehabilitation, noting that respondent had abstained from alcohol for over five years, sought treatment without State Bar intervention, and performed exemplary legal work upon returning to practice. Under these circumstances, the court concluded that supplementing criminal sanctions with professional discipline was unwarranted.

Disposition