In the Matter of Respondent J

Facts

Respondent J was the subject of a disciplinary proceeding that ultimately resolved by stipulation to a nine-month stayed suspension. After the California Supreme Court entered its order imposing discipline and awarding costs to the State Bar, a certificate of costs was issued totaling $3,696, consisting of State Bar Court costs and costs incurred by the Office of Investigation and the Office of Trial Counsel.

The costs were assessed under the State Bar’s standardized cost formulas, which assign average recoverable costs based on the procedural stage at which a disciplinary matter is resolved. Because the stipulation was reached after the filing of formal charges but before trial, the matter was assessed at “Level II” costs, which are higher than costs assessed for matters resolved prior to the filing of a notice to show cause.

Respondent moved before the hearing judge for full or partial relief from the cost award. He argued that the Level II assessment was excessive because, for nearly eleven months before formal charges were filed, he had repeatedly offered to stipulate to the same discipline ultimately imposed, had cooperated extensively with the State Bar’s investigation, and had provided extraordinary assistance by organizing and explaining complex trust account records. According to respondent, the delay in resolving the matter prior to formal charges was attributable to the State Bar’s lack of responsiveness, including repeated reassignment of State Bar attorneys.

The hearing judge agreed in part, eliminating all Level II costs and reducing certain Level I costs by 50 percent. The Office of Trials sought review, contending that the hearing judge abused her discretion in granting any cost relief.

Issues Presented

• Whether a hearing judge has authority under Business and Professions Code section 6086.10 to grant partial relief from disciplinary costs.
• Whether the hearing judge abused her discretion in reducing costs absent bad faith by State Bar counsel.

Respondent’s Position

Respondent argued that “good cause” for relief from costs includes extraordinary cooperation and good-faith efforts to resolve a disciplinary matter prior to the filing of formal charges. He emphasized that he went well beyond his statutory duty to cooperate, saving the State Bar substantial investigative and analytical effort, and that the delay in settlement was not attributable to him.

State Bar’s Position

The Office of Trials argued that standardized cost models should be applied mechanically and that allowing reductions based on settlement negotiations or cooperation would undermine the efficiency and predictability of the disciplinary cost system. It further contended that, absent proof of bad faith by State Bar counsel, cost relief was unwarranted.

Court’s Ruling

The Review Department affirmed the hearing judge’s order and denied the State Bar’s petition for review. Applying an abuse of discretion standard, the court held that Business and Professions Code section 6086.10 and the Rules of Procedure expressly authorize full or partial relief from costs based on hardship, special circumstances, or other good cause.

The court rejected the State Bar’s argument that cost formulas preclude individualized relief. While formulaic assessments are appropriate as a general rule, they do not strip hearing judges of discretion to grant relief where justice so requires. The Review Department emphasized that good cause may include consideration of the conduct of State Bar counsel, even absent bad faith.

Here, the hearing judge reasonably concluded that respondent’s extraordinary cooperation and repeated good-faith efforts to settle the matter at an earlier stage justified eliminating Level II costs and reducing certain Level I costs. The Review Department found no manifest miscarriage of justice and therefore no abuse of discretion.

Disposition