In the Matter of Respondent M

Facts

Respondent M was admitted to the California State Bar in 1972 and had practiced law for approximately 22 years with no prior disciplinary record. In the early evening of December 13, 1992, respondent drove while under the influence of alcohol and made a left turn at an intersection directly in front of a motorcycle police officer, resulting in a collision that caused the officer serious injury.

On March 18, 1993, respondent pled no contest to and was convicted of violating Vehicle Code section 23153(a), driving under the influence causing injury, a felony. Breath and urine testing reflected a blood-alcohol concentration well above the legal limit. Respondent was placed on three years of summary probation with multiple conditions, including alcohol education, community service with the California Youth Authority, attendance at Mothers Against Drunk Driving programs, suspension of driving privileges, and payment of fines and assessments.

Solely based on the felony conviction, the State Bar Court ordered respondent placed on interim suspension pursuant to Business and Professions Code section 6102(a). Respondent promptly filed a petition to vacate the interim suspension order. While the petition was pending, respondent’s felony conviction was reduced to a misdemeanor under Penal Code section 17(b), and respondent submitted evidence of compliance with probation and rehabilitation requirements.

Charges / Issues Presented

• Whether interim suspension was required following a felony DUI conviction
• Whether “good cause” existed to vacate interim suspension under Business & Professions Code § 6102(a)
• How the likely range of final discipline should factor into interim suspension decisions

Defenses

Respondent argued that interim suspension would impose a level of discipline far more severe than any discipline likely to be imposed after a full hearing. He emphasized that the offense was unrelated to clients or the practice of law, involved no intentional violence, and did not reflect dishonesty or moral turpitude.

Respondent further relied on his long, discipline-free career, the absence of any harm to clients, compliance with criminal probation, and precedent showing that similar drunk-driving convictions often resulted in reproval or short suspensions rather than lengthy actual suspension.

Court’s Ruling

The Review Department held that interim suspension following a felony conviction is not automatic. Whether interim suspension is warranted depends on multiple factors, including the nature of the crime, its relationship to the practice of law, the undisputed surrounding facts, and — critically — the likely range of final discipline.

Although drunk driving is a serious societal problem, the court emphasized that it may or may not warrant professional discipline in a particular case. Here, respondent’s conduct did not involve clients, the courts, or legal practice, and the Office of Chief Trial Counsel identified no danger to clients or adverse impact on respondent’s practice.

The court concluded that interim suspension would likely result in respondent being barred from practice for a period longer than any discipline ultimately imposed. Because such an outcome would create substantial injustice, the Review Department found good cause to vacate the interim suspension order and allowed the disciplinary matter to proceed on the merits.

Disposition / Sanctions

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